Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
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Recommendations
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
Cited in
(27)- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
- Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Information requirements for mechanism design
- Interpreted and generated signals
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
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