Information-based discrimination

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.01.001MaRDI QIDQ7006699zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Naomi M. Utgoff

Publication date 27 March 2025

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

discriminationmarket designrelational contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53256 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• Matching through position auctions
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Optimal Auction Design
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

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