Optimal student allocation with peer effects

DOI10.1007/S10058-024-00349-XMaRDI QIDQ6641269zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita

Publication date 20 November 2024

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10058-024-00349-X

zbMATH Keywords

externalitymechanism designstudent allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• A model of vertically differentiated education
• An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability
• Inferring optimal peer assignment from experimental data
• Constrained school choice
• Stability in matching markets with peer effects

Cites work

• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Extreme Points of Moment Sets
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Matching with Externalities
• Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal taxation with rent-seeking
• Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model*
• Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities

This page was built for publication: Optimal student allocation with peer effects

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6641269)