Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3893204 (Why is no real title available?)
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
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- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
Cited in
(19)- When queueing is better than push and shove
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Relative priority policies for minimizing the cost of queueing systems with service discrimination
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
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