When queueing is better than push and shove
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Publication:532746
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0198-XzbMATH Open1211.90050OpenAlexW3122397081MaRDI QIDQ532746FDOQ532746
Authors: Alex Gershkov, Paul Schweinzer 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13407/1/144.pdf
Recommendations
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36)
Cites Work
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Optimal Auction Design
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
Cited In (12)
- Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
- Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- Optimal queue to minimize waste
- Concurrent counting is harder than queuing
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Reordering an existing queue
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
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