Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.007zbMath1309.91069OpenAlexW2298976392MaRDI QIDQ406371

Youngsub Chun, René van den Brink, Yuan Ju

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=download&seqidx=34

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueimplementationqueueing problembidding mechanismmaximal transfer ruleminimal transfer rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery ⋮ Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ Comments on: ``Recent developments in the queueing problem

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