Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.08.006zbMATH Open1403.90231OpenAlexW2761005027MaRDI QIDQ1680100FDOQ1680100

Authors: Francis Bloch 

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.006

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Cites Work

• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
• No-envy in queueing problems
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
• Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
• Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem

Cited In (1)

• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

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