Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
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Publication:2036921
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109824zbMath1467.91096OpenAlexW3137007398MaRDI QIDQ2036921
Publication date: 30 June 2021
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109824
Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessmatching with contractsgroup strategy-proofnessobservable substitutability
Cites Work
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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