Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109824zbMath1467.91096OpenAlexW3137007398MaRDI QIDQ2036921

Yusuke Kasuya

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109824

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessmatching with contractsgroup strategy-proofnessobservable substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
• The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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