The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.012zbMath1255.91303OpenAlexW2049639164MaRDI QIDQ1934818

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityPareto optimalitytwo-sided matchinglaw of aggregate demandsubstitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items

Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts ⋮ Quantile stable mechanisms ⋮ Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Cites Work

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