The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Cited in
(6)- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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