Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2341129
DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0849-0zbMATH Open1318.91132OpenAlexW2036237600MaRDI QIDQ2341129FDOQ2341129
Authors: Agustín G. Bonifacio 
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0849-0
Recommendations
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Manipulation through bribes
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- Manipulation via Endowments
- The division problem with voluntary participation
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (6)
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
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