Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2341129
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0849-0zbMath1318.91132OpenAlexW2036237600MaRDI QIDQ2341129
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0849-0
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items
Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped, Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results, Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences, Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
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