Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2341129
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187072 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Manipulation through bribes
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- The division problem with voluntary participation
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cited in
(6)- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
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