Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
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Publication:2406941
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.03.002zbMath1397.91268OpenAlexW2338611118MaRDI QIDQ2406941
Publication date: 4 October 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.002
endowmentmultiple goodsauction marketdestruction-proof mechanismper-capita goods-buyer submodularity
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Cites Work
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
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- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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