Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90012-4zbMath0815.90013OpenAlexW2091200509MaRDI QIDQ1342681

Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 27 June 1995

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90012-4

zbMATH Keywords

endowmentsmanipulationLindahl equilibriumdonationssingle private goodsingle public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (13)

The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Existence, uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement ⋮ Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? ⋮ The Lindahl solution with changing population and recsources ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

Cites Work

• Manipulation via Endowments

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