The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
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Publication:2366923
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90243-RzbMath0797.90127OpenAlexW2042202971MaRDI QIDQ2366923
Publication date: 30 August 1993
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90243-r
Related Items (6)
The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
Cites Work
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- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
- Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
- The Bargaining Problem
- Synopses in the Theory of Choice
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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