Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2394zbMath0911.90015MaRDI QIDQ1268574

Lu Hong

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2394

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economy; endowment condition; feasible Bayesian implementation; feasible Nash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent, A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism, The endowment game when \(n = 2\), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments

Cites Work

• Implementation in differential information economies
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Nash implementation in production economies
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms