Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1415914
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00053-3zbMath1054.91032MaRDI QIDQ1415914
Publication date: 9 December 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (10)
Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods ⋮ Hierarchical allocation ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Restricted housewapping games
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
This page was built for publication: Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
