Restricted housewapping games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00780-XzbMATH Open0880.90145WikidataQ127549455 ScholiaQ127549455MaRDI QIDQ1361899FDOQ1361899

Thomas Quint

Publication date: 28 July 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

coreequilibriumindivisible goodsone-sided matching gamesrestricted houseswapping gamesweak balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• The assignment game. I: The core
• Combinatorial matrix theory
• The Core of an N Person Game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• On one-sided versus two-sided matching games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Permutation games: Another class of totally balanced games
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• Cores of partitioning games
• Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (9)

• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
• The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games
• ON TWO THEOREMS OF QUINZII AND RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING ALLOCATION IN SWEDEN
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
• Restriction of simple games
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

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