Restricted housewapping games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00780-XzbMath0880.90145WikidataQ127549455 ScholiaQ127549455MaRDI QIDQ1361899

Thomas Quint

Publication date: 28 July 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium; core; indivisible goods; one-sided matching games; restricted houseswapping games; weak balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods, The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games, Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf, Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods, Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods., An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf, ON TWO THEOREMS OF QUINZII AND RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING ALLOCATION IN SWEDEN

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