Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
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Publication:1075936
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90090-6zbMath0592.90017OpenAlexW2018431058MaRDI QIDQ1075936
Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90090-6
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Cites Work
- Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium
- Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players
- Second best taxation as a game
- Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- The Core of an N Person Game
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