The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
DOI10.1007/BF01247101zbMATH Open0846.90132OpenAlexW2061391679MaRDI QIDQ1914092FDOQ1914092
Authors: Shlomo Weber, Eyal Winter, R. Deb 
Publication date: 3 October 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01247101
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free entryfree mobilityquota gameseffective coalitions\({\mathcal S}\)-equilibriumstable coalition structure
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
Cited In (4)
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