Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

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Cites work

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
House allocation with existing tenants
Implementation in generalized matching problems
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Matching with aggregate externalities
On cores and indivisibility
On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
Stability of marriage with externalities
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
Two-sided matching problems with externalities
Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(7)

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
Household formation and markets
Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik competitive markets
The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf

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