Two-sided matching problems with externalities

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0077zbMath0859.90011MaRDI QIDQ1815196

Hiroo Sasaki, Manabu Toda

Publication date: 10 April 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

zbMATH Keywords

stability of matchings; two-sided matching markets with externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B08: Individual preferences

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