Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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Publication:1815196
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0077zbMATH Open0859.90011OpenAlexW1974473105MaRDI QIDQ1815196FDOQ1815196
Publication date: 10 April 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0077
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