The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003088MaRDI QIDQ3166248zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kimmo Eriksson, Fredrik Jansson, Thomas Vetander

Publication date 10 October 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitytwo-sided matchingsocial preferencesnegative externalitiesassignment gamestable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• A note on the multiple partners assignment game
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Cited in

(4)

• A solution concept related to ``bounded rationality for some two-echelon models
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences

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