The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003088zbMATH Open1259.91017MaRDI QIDQ3166248FDOQ3166248

Kimmo Eriksson, Thomas Vetander, Fredrik Jansson

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• A note on the multiple partners assignment game
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitytwo-sided matchingsocial preferencesnegative externalitiesassignment gamestable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Stability of marriage with externalities

Cited In (4)

• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• A Solution Concept Related to “Bounded Rationality” for some Two-Echelon Models

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