Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3867093 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48311 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments
- A note on a theorem of Aumann and Drèze
- An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The bargaining problem: axioms concerning changes in the conflict point
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
Cited in
(13)- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
- Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
- The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- On assignment games
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
- Reinterpreting the kernel
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