Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

DOI10.1007/BF01761075MaRDI QIDQ751520zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benny Moldovanu

Publication date 1990

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761075

zbMATH Keywords

stability propertiespre-kernelassignment gamesstable solutioncore-kernel intersectiongames without side paymentsnontransferrable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Assignment games with stable core
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
• On assignment games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3867093 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48311 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The bargaining problem: axioms concerning changes in the conflict point
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The kernel of a cooperative game

Cited in

(13)

• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
• Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
• The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
• A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
• On assignment games
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
• Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
• Reinterpreting the kernel

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