Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
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Publication:857827
DOI10.1007/S00186-006-0100-6zbMath1149.91015OpenAlexW2078814866MaRDI QIDQ857827
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0100-6
Related Items (3)
Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core
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