The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
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The authors propose bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games, which coincides with the prekernel for TU games and with the Nash set for pure bargaining games. An axiomatization is given on a specific class of games.
Recommendations
- The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592676
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5823893
Cites work
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- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
- Bargaining and Value
- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4170685 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3347963 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independence of irrelevant expansions
- Monotonicity and independence axioms
- On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- Stability and the Nash solution
- The bargaining problem
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
Cited in
(7)- Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core
- Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
- The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
- The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
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