On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation

DOI10.2307/1911109MaRDI QIDQ3877345zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wayne J. Shafer

Publication date 1980

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911109

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining strengthcardinal value allocationsexamplesexchange economyexistenceexistence of ordinal value allocationsinterpretationno transferable utilityvalue allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited in

(21)

• Existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences
• When do market games have transferable utility?
• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
• The compromise value for NTU-games
• On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
• Values for Markovian coalition processes
• Compromise values in cooperative game theory
• Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information
• The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games
• The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
• The equal split-off set for NTU-games
• Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
• Money-metrics in local welfare analysis: Pareto improvements and equity considerations
• Gately values of cooperative games
• Two families of values for global cooperative games
• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms
• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value

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