On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry
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Publication:1196125
DOI10.1007/BF01245461zbMath0758.90091MaRDI QIDQ1196125
Publication date: 7 December 1992
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Shapley value; bargaining power; non-transferable utility; Harsanyi solution; non-symmetric Nash solution
91A12: Cooperative games
Cites Work
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