An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1.4.381MaRDI QIDQ4160723zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. Asscher

Publication date 1976

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.4.381

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited in

(11)

• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure
• A three-person cooperative game formulation of the world oil market
• A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments
• The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games
• The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
• On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games
• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
• The equal split-off set for NTU-games
• On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
• A theory of farsightedness in committee games

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