Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1136947
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90027-9zbMath0427.90092MaRDI QIDQ1136947
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90027-9
bargaining set; coalition formation; blocking coalitions; behavioral analysis; psi-stability; stable payoffs; structural equilibrium
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations, On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
Cites Work