Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
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Publication:1319017
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90006-7zbMath0804.90031MaRDI QIDQ1319017
Publication date: 19 January 1995
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31092
existence of equilibria; exchange market; Walrasian equilibria; indivisible, heterogeneous good; rebargaining
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Cites Work
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