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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099365 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
Cited in
(20)- Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
- Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Matching with aggregate externalities
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- The structure of stable marriage with indifference
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
- A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
- Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
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