Stability of marriage with externalities

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9zbMath1153.91689MaRDI QIDQ956582

Isa E. Hafalir

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative games; matching; externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities, Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents, Matching with aggregate externalities, Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples, Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability, Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies, The roommate problem with externalities, Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities, Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching, Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms, A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms, Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities, THE ASSIGNMENT GAME WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY

Cites Work

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