Stability of marriage with externalities
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Publication:956582
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9zbMath1153.91689MaRDI QIDQ956582
Publication date: 25 November 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9
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