Stability of marriage with externalities

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0122-9zbMATH Open1153.91689OpenAlexW2130543692MaRDI QIDQ956582FDOQ956582

Authors: Isa E. Hafalir 

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9

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zbMATH Keywords

matchingcooperative gamesexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model

Cited In (19)

• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• The structure of stable marriage with indifference
• Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• The roommate problem with externalities
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
• The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
• Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
• A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems

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