A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
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