A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
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Publication:6664580
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105919MaRDI QIDQ6664580FDOQ6664580
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
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- Stability in repeated matching markets
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