The core of a monetary economy without trust

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90104-7MaRDI QIDQ598981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Douglas Gale

Publication date 1978

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90104-7

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintymoneygeneral equilibrium theoryatomless measure space of agentsblocking conceptbreaking promisescore and equilibriagame theoretic economic modelintertemporal exchanges between agentssequential coresequential exchange model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
• A characterization of the optimality of equilibrium in incomplete markets
• Equilibrium with Transaction Costs
• Inefficiency and the Demand for "Money" in a Sequence Economy
• Money and the Decentralization of Exchange
• On Transaction Costs, Inessential Sequence Economies and Money
• On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete
• The Price of Money in a Pure Exchange Monetary Economy with Taxation

Cited in

(24)

• The transactions cost of money (a strategic market game analysis)
• On the core of dynamic cooperative games
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets
• Coalitions with limited coordination
• Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
• The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• A note on the core of a monetary economy
• The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
• Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies
• Deviations, uncertainty and the core
• CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
• Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
• A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
• Signaling, screening, and core stability
• Money, information and equilibrium in large economies
• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
• A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
• Core concepts for incomplete market economies
• Competitive equilibria and the core of overlapping generations economies
• A characterization of the core in overlapping-generations economies
• Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players

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