Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
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Publication:1756324
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.005zbMath1419.91528OpenAlexW2275931385WikidataQ129558063 ScholiaQ129558063MaRDI QIDQ1756324
Maciej H. Kotowski, Sangram Vilasrao Kadam
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=9763&type=WPN
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