The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
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Publication:1961975
DOI10.1007/s001820050126zbMath0942.91008MaRDI QIDQ1961975
Publication date: 30 January 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050126
matching; complete lattice; optimal matching; assignment game; stable payoffs; multiple partners; optimal stable outcomes
91A12: Cooperative games
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