Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures (Q776855)

The authors consider a bilateral oligopoly market under different conditions of a price-fee competition with the aim to find optimal behavior of buyers and suppliers, of supply and demand, and to discuss market outcomes and joint welfare. As mathematical background they use ideas of assignment games and make extensive use of the associated environment (cores of the games, lattice structure of the cores, (Bertrand) equilibria, coalitions). After an Introduction containing especially economic remarks there follow chapter 2 explaining the model considered in the paper, chapter 3 with examples, the main chapter 4, which contains the presentation of the new results and their detailed economic interpretation (also with examples and two figures), then chapter 5 with concluding remarks also on possible future research. In an Appendix one finds the proofs of the theorems, discussed in chapter 4. Those theorems in chapter 4 concern in particular: stable market outcomes and its precise prediction; equilibria in the negotiation model; Pareto efficiency in connection with oligopolistic competition in prices and fees; infrastructures that achieves maximal consumer protection.