Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00695-ZzbMATH Open1450.91023OpenAlexW3125704252MaRDI QIDQ776855FDOQ776855

Authors: Yukihiko Funaki, Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova 

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00695-z

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zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscoreequilibriainfrastructurePareto efficiencymarket powernegotiationsassignment gamesconsumer protectionnon-linear pricingprice-fee competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Microeconomic theory
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
• Additively decomposed quasiconvex functions
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games

Cited In (4)

• Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition
• Bilateral market structures and regulatory policies in international telephone markets
• An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly
• Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies

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