Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6538826
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| English | Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6538826 |
Statements
Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (English)
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3 February 2016
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stable matching
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market design
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0.8461779356002808
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0.8126915097236633
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0.80010586977005
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0.7980837821960449
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0.7923427820205688
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