The Recursive Core
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Publication:4836508
DOI10.2307/2951631zbMATH Open0835.90014OpenAlexW2021993836MaRDI QIDQ4836508FDOQ4836508
Authors: Robert A. Becker, Subir K. Chakrabarti
Publication date: 15 April 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951631
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Cited In (10)
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
- The weak sequential core for two-period economies
- The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
- Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
- Core concepts for incomplete market economies
- The existence of core allocations in a one sector model of capital accumulation
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
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