Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
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Publication:1996183
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Matching with aggregate externalities
- On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
- On random stable partitions
- Stability of marriage with externalities
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
- Stable roommates problem with random preferences
- The ``stable roommates problem with random preferences
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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