Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
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Publication:1996183
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.003zbMath1458.91143OpenAlexW3085459761MaRDI QIDQ1996183
Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, Milton dos Santos Braitt
Publication date: 3 March 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.003
Related Items (2)
Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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