Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.003zbMath1458.91143OpenAlexW3085459761MaRDI QIDQ1996183

Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, Milton dos Santos Braitt

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatching marketsexternalitiesrandom preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences

Cites Work

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• Matching with aggregate externalities
• The ``stable roommates problem with random preferences
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• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• On random stable partitions
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Stable roommates problem with random preferences
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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