Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
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Publication:2019341
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.05.004zbMATH Open1461.91193OpenAlexW3122421981MaRDI QIDQ2019341FDOQ2019341
Authors: Bo Chen
Publication date: 26 April 2021
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.05.004
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- The welfare consequences of a quantitative search and matching approach to the labor market
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- Comparative statics in matching markets
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Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The nonatomic assignment model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
- Matching with aggregate externalities
- Stability of marriage with externalities
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- KKM principle, fixed points, and Nash equilibria
- Stable matching in large economies
- Competing teams
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
Cited In (8)
- Competing teams
- A market structure for an environment with heterogeneous job-matches, indivisible labor and persistent unemployment
- To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints
- Specialization and efficiency with labor-market matching
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
- Global dynamics in a model with search and matching in labor and capital markets
- Efficiency in a search and matching economy with a competitive informal sector
- ON THE USE OF FIRM FIXED EFFECTS AS A PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE FOR ANALYZING LABOR MARKET MATCHING
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