The welfare consequences of a quantitative search and matching approach to the labor market
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Publication:4628007
DOI10.1111/BOER.12160zbMATH Open1407.91104OpenAlexW2800820570WikidataQ129914246 ScholiaQ129914246MaRDI QIDQ4628007FDOQ4628007
Authors: Masanori Kashiwagi 
Publication date: 6 March 2019
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12160
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- LIFE‐CYCLE LABOR SEARCH WITH STOCHASTIC MATCH QUALITY
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- Who wins, who loses? Identification of conditional causal effects, and the welfare impact of changing wages
- ON THE USE OF FIRM FIXED EFFECTS AS A PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE FOR ANALYZING LABOR MARKET MATCHING
- Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
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