Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
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Publication:2629324
DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9524-xzbMath1378.91108OpenAlexW2124617528WikidataQ59475139 ScholiaQ59475139MaRDI QIDQ2629324
P. E. M. Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Emiliya A. Lazarova
Publication date: 6 July 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9524-x
matchingPareto optimal matchingcompensation schedulecompensational stabilitycontractual exchange stability
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