Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9524-XzbMATH Open1378.91108OpenAlexW2124617528WikidataQ59475139 ScholiaQ59475139MaRDI QIDQ2629324FDOQ2629324

Authors: Peter Borm, Emiliya A. Lazarova, Arantza Estévez-Fernández 

Publication date: 6 July 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9524-x

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zbMATH Keywords

matchingPareto optimal matchingcompensation schedulecompensational stabilitycontractual exchange stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• The exchange-stable marriage problem
• On the complexity of exchange-stable roommates
• Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

Cited In (6)

• Comparative Static and Computational Methods for an Empirical One-to-one Transferable Utility Matching Model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
• Estimating matching games with transfers
• Sequential bankruptcy problems
• Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility

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