Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9524-xzbMath1378.91108OpenAlexW2124617528WikidataQ59475139 ScholiaQ59475139MaRDI QIDQ2629324

P. E. M. Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Emiliya A. Lazarova

Publication date: 6 July 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9524-x

zbMATH Keywords

matchingPareto optimal matchingcompensation schedulecompensational stabilitycontractual exchange stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences ⋮ Sequential bankruptcy problems

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