Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0421-0MaRDI QIDQ2486954zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luca Anderlini, Roger Lagunoff

Publication date 17 August 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0421-0

zbMATH Keywords

CommunicationCoverups.Dynastic repeated gamesWhitewashing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
• A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games

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