General properties of long-run supergames
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Publication:692092
DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0018-3zbMATH Open1261.91006OpenAlexW2165185825MaRDI QIDQ692092FDOQ692092
Authors: Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala 
Publication date: 4 December 2012
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15297/1/signalsjrttcorrect.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Symbolic dynamics and supergames
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
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