On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling

DOI10.1287/moor.25.4.552.12113zbMath1014.91008OpenAlexW2069169277MaRDI QIDQ2757652

Jérôme Renault

Publication date: 26 November 2001

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/861bffb30fd9093ef2ca4a26dfa2153e733cafc2

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationexistence of equilibriumimperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ The Value of Markov Chain Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Sender-receiver games with cooperation ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ A folk theorem for minority games ⋮ Equilibrium existence and topology in some repeated games with incomplete information

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