Recommendations
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099351 (Why is no real title available?)
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- On two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling
- Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
Cited in
(11)- Minority game: A mean-field-like approach
- General properties of long-run supergames
- Crowd-anticrowd theory of the minority game
- Strategies and evolution in the minority game: a multi-round strategy experiment
- Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- Repeated games with complete information
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- The local minority game
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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