A folk theorem for minority games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.013zbMath1122.91019OpenAlexW2040682131MaRDI QIDQ815213

Sergio Scarlatti, Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6223

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringpublic signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Strategies and evolution in the minority game: a multi-round strategy experiment

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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