A folk theorem for minority games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.013zbMATH Open1122.91019OpenAlexW2040682131MaRDI QIDQ815213FDOQ815213

Authors: Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti, Marco Scarsini 

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6223

Recommendations

• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringpublic signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• On two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.

Cited In (11)

• Repeated games with complete information
• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
• General properties of long-run supergames
• Strategies and evolution in the minority game: a multi-round strategy experiment
• Minority game: A mean-field-like approach
• Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
• The local minority game
• Crowd-anticrowd theory of the minority game
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games

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