Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226083 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099351 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- On two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Repeated proximity games.
Cited in
(31)- General properties of long-run supergames
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
- A folk theorem for minority games
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
- Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
- Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
- Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Repeated games with complete information
- A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
- Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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