Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:705871
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.12.005zbMATH Open1121.91014OpenAlexW2143653381MaRDI QIDQ705871FDOQ705871
Authors: Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala 
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005
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Cites Work
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- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- On two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
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- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
- Repeated proximity games.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (31)
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- A folk theorem for minority games
- Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- General properties of long-run supergames
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
- Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
- Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games
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