Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:705871
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005zbMath1121.91014OpenAlexW2143653381MaRDI QIDQ705871
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005
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