Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2013.0594MaRDI QIDQ5169682zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tristan Tomala

Publication date 11 July 2014

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0594

zbMATH Keywords

communication equilibriumimperfect monitoringincomplete informationrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(12)

• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Dynamic communication with biased senders
• Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
• How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
• A differential game on Wasserstein space. Application to weak approachability with partial monitoring
• Exponential weight approachability, applications to calibration and regret minimization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5320338 (Why is no real title available?)
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication

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