Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

DOI10.1287/moor.13.2.191zbMath0652.90108OpenAlexW1974120322MaRDI QIDQ3798503

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.2.191

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminformation transmissionnoisy channelslack of information on one sidecommunication deviceextensive form correlated equilibriumautonomous devicenonzero-sum two-person infinitely repeated gamesnormal form correlated equilibriumr-communication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (8)

Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games ⋮ A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation ⋮ Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ On approximate and weak correlated equilibria in constrained discounted stochastic games ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Correlated equilibria in stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs

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