Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

DOI10.1287/MOOR.13.2.191zbMATH Open0652.90108OpenAlexW1974120322MaRDI QIDQ3798503FDOQ3798503

Authors: Françoise Forges 

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.2.191

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminformation transmissionnoisy channelslack of information on one sidecommunication deviceextensive form correlated equilibriumautonomous devicenonzero-sum two-person infinitely repeated gamesnormal form correlated equilibriumr-communication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
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• A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
• Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
• Correlated equilibria in stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs

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