Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0381-YMaRDI QIDQ2453491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Igal Milchtaich

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0381-y

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamescorrelated equilibriumextraneous signalsgames with incomplete informationmechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The author considers a special class of games with incomplete information determined as Bayesian games, where players can receive signals about the ``state of nature, which divide players into different types, and messages. Having signals and messages, players choose their actions. Mechanisms of this information processes are differentiated by the messages' properties, for instance, by their content, by their mutual dependence (correlation), by their randomness, etc. Each of these kinds yields a different game equilibrium concept. The author gives some relations among these concepts and a basis for their classification.

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226087 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(7)

• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Universal Mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978462 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games
• A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

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